Socratic elenchus
from 430 BCE Approximate; the practice predates any written account of it
Ask a man to define what he claims to know, then show him that his own further beliefs contradict the definition he gave.
- Active
- from 430 BCE
- Where
- Athens
- Also
- elenchos
- Status
- In use
- Tradition
- Classical procedures
What it is
The elenchus is a procedure of refutation carried out entirely from the other person's own commitments. Socrates asks for a definition, secures agreement to some further claims that seem harmless, and then draws out a contradiction between them and the definition.
Nothing is imported. The interlocutor is never told he is wrong by an outside authority — he is shown that he already disagreed with himself.
How it works
Ask what X is, and press until you have a definition rather than an example. Secure agreement to further premises the interlocutor accepts readily. Derive from those premises the negation of the original definition. Note that the interlocutor believed all of it at once.
The procedure ends in aporia — a stuck place — far more often than in a replacement definition. That is not a failure of the method; on Socrates's account it is the point.
The moves, in order
- Ask for a definition of X
- Secure assent to further premises the interlocutor already holds
- Show that those premises entail not-X, or contradict the definition
- Observe that the interlocutor held both at once
- Rest in the resulting aporia rather than supplying an answer
The procedure
Proposition Courage is standing firm in battle.
- Laches, asked what courage is, answers that it is standing firm in battle.
- He agrees, separately, that courage is admirable in every case where it is found.
- He agrees also that a soldier who stands firm out of sheer ignorance of the danger is not admirable but foolish.
- But such a soldier is standing firm in battle, and so counts as courageous on the definition given.
- So the definition makes something courageous that Laches himself will not call admirable.
Therefore The definition is not one Laches can hold together with what he already believes, and he has no replacement to hand.
This shows the elenchus rather than plain refutation because every premise came from Laches. Socrates advances no theory of courage at any point, and the dialogue ends without one.
What it is good for
Clearing away confident, unexamined definitions — particularly in ethics, where people are certain they know what a word means until asked. It is also the best available method for showing someone that a belief they hold is doing no work.
Where it fails
It refutes without replacing. A method that reliably empties a position and reliably fails to fill it can leave the interlocutor worse off than it found him, and the historical Socrates was tried partly for the wreckage.
It is also vulnerable to a patient opponent. The contradiction is drawn from premises the interlocutor conceded, so anyone willing to concede nothing is untouchable — and anyone willing to withdraw a concession can escape at any point.
Common misconceptions
That it is a teaching technique for leading students to a predetermined answer. That is the modern classroom version and it inverts the original, which has no answer waiting at the end.
Where it came from
Practised by Socrates in the Athenian agora and known only through others. Plato's early dialogues are the fullest record, Xenophon gives a plainer and less philosophical one.
What became of it
Split in two. The sceptical academy took the refutation and dropped the search; Plato kept the search and gradually replaced the refutation with positive doctrine.
Lasting influence
Every subsequent dialectical practice descends from it, and it is the reason philosophy is conducted as argument between persons rather than as pronouncement.
Why it still matters
It is still the fastest way to find out whether someone means anything by a word they are using with confidence.
Put another way
A building inspector who can condemn a house but cannot build one.
Texts
Plato, Laches
The shortest of the definitional dialogues and the cleanest specimen of the procedure, because it ends in failure without any positive doctrine smuggled in.
Where to start
Read Laches, then Euthyphro. Both are short and both end without an answer.
The surprising bit
Socrates claims the method leaves him as ignorant as his interlocutor. He is not being modest — on his account the shared aporia is the achievement.
In their own words
I know that I know nothing
Who held it
Laches, Euthyphro
Connections
- Relies on
- Reductio ad absurdum
- Influenced
- Platonic dialectic, Aporia
- Parallel to
- Pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta
The verdict
Unmatched at destroying false confidence, and honest about being able to do nothing else.