Two positions on what a sentence about God can do, held by people who agreed about everything else.
God
A supreme being, variously conceived - and a concept whose attributes generate most of the problems attached to it.
- Theme
- Cosmos, the sacred and ultimate reality
- Tradition
- Cross-tradition
- Term fixed
- c. 1270
In plain terms
Most arguments about God are not about whether something exists. They are about which concept is in play.
Classical theism specifies a being that is all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good, outside time, and utterly simple - not made of parts, not one thing among others. That is a demanding specification, and nearly every famous problem attaches to it: how a timeless being acts, how an immutable one responds, how omniscience leaves room for choices, how perfect goodness coexists with suffering.
Other conceptions dissolve some of these and create others. A God within time can respond and cannot be immutable. A God who is not omnipotent has no problem of evil and is not what most traditions have claimed.
So the arguments are downstream of a definition that was itself argued into place.
As a philosopher would put it
The classical package is developed jointly by Maimonides, Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī and Aquinas, and the attributes interlock. Divine simplicity - that God is not composed of parts and is identical with the divine attributes - is the load-bearing one, and it generates the difficulties: if God is identical with his goodness and his knowledge, then those are identical with each other, which is hard to state coherently.
The internal tensions are well catalogued. Omnipotence meets the paradox of the stone and, more seriously, the question of whether God can do the logically impossible. Omniscience meets foreknowledge and freedom. Timelessness meets the problem of how a being outside time can act at a moment or respond to a prayer.
The apophatic tradition responds by denying that any positive predicate applies literally - Maimonides is the strictest, holding that we may say only what God is not. Process theology takes the other exit, giving up immutability and unlimited power to keep responsiveness.
Where you meet it
Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed, written around 1190, argues that no positive attribute can be predicated of God without compromising unity.
To say God is wise is to attribute a quality distinct from the essence, which introduces composition into a simple being. His conclusion is that positive attributes must be understood either as negations - God is wise means God is not ignorant - or as descriptions of effects rather than of the divine nature.
The consequence is severe and he accepts it: the more negations one accumulates, the closer one comes, and any positive statement about the divine essence is strictly false.
Aquinas, reading him closely, could not accept the strict version and developed analogy instead - terms applied to God and to creatures neither univocally nor equivocally but proportionally. That move is what allows Christian theology to keep saying God is good and mean something.
The disagreement is about what a sentence about God can do, and both positions were held by people who agreed about everything else.
What is actually disputed
Whether the classical concept is coherent.
The attributes are individually plausible and jointly strained. Divine simplicity appears to conflict with God having distinct attributes at all; timelessness with acting or responding; omnipotence with the existence of anything God cannot do, including the impossible; omniscience with libertarian freedom.
Each has proposed solutions and none commands agreement.
The modern division is between classical theists, who accept the package and work at the tensions, and open or process theists, who revise the attributes to remove them - typically giving up unlimited foreknowledge or unlimited power. Critics of the revisions argue they produce a being not worth calling God; critics of the classical view argue it produces a being nobody could relate to.
And the non-theistic traditions raise a prior question: whether an ultimate reality has to be a being at all, which Advaita and Buddhism both answer no.
Commonly confused with
- a god Polytheistic deities are beings within a cosmos. The classical concept is of the source of the cosmos, and the difference is not one of number.
- Brahman c. 800 Advaita's Brahman is impersonal and without qualities, and treating the terms as equivalent assumes a reading that Advaita rejects.
- the first cause That is a conclusion of one argument, not a definition. Most of the classical attributes do not follow from it.
Defined against
- Nature Whether the ultimate is a being distinct from the world or is the world under another description is the division between theism and every form of pantheism
Philosophers
- Thomas Aquinas The classical synthesis of the attributes
- Maimonides The strict negative theology
- Avicenna The necessary existent, argued from contingency
- Al-Ghazali Divine will against natural necessity
- Baruch Spinoza God identified with nature, with no will or purpose
- Anselm of Canterbury That than which nothing greater can be conceived
Works
- Summa Theologiae The systematic account of the attributes
- The Guide for the Perplexed Negative theology at its strictest
- The Book of Healing The necessary existent
- The Incoherence of the Philosophers Divine will defended against the philosophers
- Ethics God as nature, without personality
- Proslogion The ontological formulation
Schools
- Thomism Where the synthesis is made
- Maimonideanism Where negation is the method
- Avicennism Where the necessary existent is derived
- Ash’arism Where divine will is unconstrained
- Spinozism Where God is identified with nature
- Process Philosophy Where the attributes are revised
Related concepts
Arguments for God 1078 · The problem of evil c. 400 · Creation c. 400 · Brahman c. 800 · Tawḥīd c. 1100
Classical theism's package of attributes - omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, simplicity, timelessness, immutability - is worked out in the medieval Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions together, and most modern objections target the package rather than the belief.