Not what life is for, but what this life was about.
Meaning of life
Whether a human life can be significant, and what would make it so - a question distinct from whether it is happy or good.
- Theme
- Life, death and meaning
- Tradition
- Cross-tradition
- Term fixed
- 1942
In plain terms
The question is a modern one. Ancient philosophy asks how to live; it does not ask whether living has a point, because the frameworks it worked in supplied one.
When that supply stopped, the question appeared - and with it three possible answers. That meaning is given from outside, by a purpose one is here to serve. That it is made, by committing to things and following through. Or that there is none, and the demand for one is a mistake.
The useful thing to notice is that meaning is not the same as happiness or as morality. A life can be pleasant and empty. It can be blameless and pointless. And it can be difficult, unhappy and unmistakably about something - which is why the three questions have to be kept apart.
As a philosopher would put it
Supernaturalism holds that meaning requires a purpose assigned by God or by a cosmic order, so that without one, life is meaningless by definition. Naturalist objectivism holds that certain activities - knowledge, love, creation, moral achievement - confer meaning whether or not anyone finds them fulfilling. Subjectivism holds that meaning is constituted by engagement: whatever a person cares about deeply enough makes their life meaningful to them.
Wolf's hybrid account is the most influential recent position: meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness, so that a life spent passionately on something worthless is not meaningful and neither is a valuable life pursued without engagement.
The distinction from happiness and morality is standard and load-bearing. Nagel's version of the problem is that the sub specie aeternitatis view makes any human project look arbitrary, and that the absurdity consists in our capacity to take that view while continuing to care - which is a diagnosis rather than a solution.
Where you meet it
Harvey Chochinov's group developed a brief intervention for people near the end of life, and it consists almost entirely of one question asked well.
Dignity therapy is a recorded interview, usually a single session, in which a person is asked about the parts of their life they most remember, what they are most proud of, what they have learned, and what they want said or known. The transcript is edited and returned to them, and they give it to whoever they choose.
A multicentre randomised trial published in 2011 found the intervention was rated by patients as helpful, as improving their sense of dignity and their sense that life had meaning, more often than either of the comparison conditions - though it did not reduce measured distress.
What is philosophically notable is the structure of the question. It does not ask what life is for. It asks what this life was about, and the answers people give are almost entirely about relationships, work and what they contributed - which is closer to the objectivist list than anyone designed it to be.
What is actually disputed
Whether the question is well formed.
One view is that meaning is a property a life can have or lack, and that the disagreement is about which. Another is that the phrase runs together several distinct questions - why anything exists, what one should do, whether one's life matters to anyone - and that treating them as one produces the sense of an unanswerable mystery.
Wittgenstein's remark that the solution to the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem points at this: those to whom the sense of life became clear could not say what constituted it.
And the objective-subjective dispute has not resolved. Subjectivism accommodates the enormous variety in what people find meaningful and licenses the conclusion that a life devoted to something trivial is as meaningful as any other. Objectivism blocks that and owes a list, and every proposed list looks like the compiler's own values written out.
Commonly confused with
- Happiness c. 340 BC A pleasant life can be empty and a hard one can be full of significance. The questions come apart in both directions.
- the origin of the universe Why there is something rather than nothing is a separate question, and answering it would not settle this one.
Defined against
- Nihilism The claim that there is no meaning is one answer to the question rather than a refusal of it, which is why the two entries define each other
Philosophers
- Albert Camus The question posed as the only serious philosophical problem
- Friedrich Nietzsche Meaning as created rather than found
- Søren Aabye Kierkegaard Meaning as requiring commitment rather than argument
- Ludwig Wittgenstein The suspicion that the question is malformed
- Arthur Schopenhauer The case that there is none, and what follows
Works
- The Myth of Sisyphus The question stated at its sharpest
- Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus The remark about the problem vanishing
- Concluding Unscientific Postscript Meaning as inseparable from commitment
- The World as Will and Representation The pessimist answer
- Meditations The ancient form of the question, which is about conduct
Schools
- Existentialism Where the question is central
- Nietzscheanism Where meaning is created
- Lebensphilosophie Where life is prior to reflection on it
- Vienna Circle Where the question is held to be meaningless
- Early Theravada Buddhism Where the question is reframed as one about suffering
Related concepts
The good life c. 400 BC · Absurdity 1942 · Nihilism 1887 · Hope c. 1270 · Death c. 300 BC
The phrase in this form is nineteenth-century and largely post-Christian; the ancient traditions ask how one should live rather than whether life has a meaning, and the shift in the question is itself a historical fact.